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I.

INTRODUCTION

Nonprofit tax-exempt organizations, particularly those
accorded Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt
1
status (commonly referred to as “charities” ) or that undertake
† The authors are principals in the Minneapolis firm, Borenstein and
McVeigh Law Office LLC. The firm provides services primarily to nonprofit
charitable organizations in the areas of corporate, employment and tax law.
Thanks to Mathea Bulander for legal research in preparation for this article.
1. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) of the 1986 Internal Revenue Code, as amended,
defines a category of exemption from income taxation, with attendant other
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community benefit efforts beyond their membership as described
2
in I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) have faced increasing demands for public
accountability for most of the last decade. For example, copies of
filed Annual Returns of Exempt Organizations (Form 990 series),
which disclose a plethora of financial and other information on
each year’s operations, must be provided to anyone who asks for
3
them within a three-year period. In addition, most charities’
Forms 990 are posted on the Internet and readily accessible to the
4
public.
Public charities and other so-called “public benefit”
benefits beyond tax exemption. (The same numbering was found in the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.) I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) enumerates as qualified for incometax exemption entities operated for one or more of eight specific purposes,
including in its list religious, educational, or charitable purposes. Entities holding
such status, regardless of which purpose(s) they serve, are commonly referred to
as “charities” or “charitable organizations.” As a further complication to the
lexicon, entities that are described as exempt under § 501(c)(3) are further
classified under I.R.C. §§ 508 and 509 as either private foundations or non-private
foundations, and the colloquial expression long-accepted for the latter
classification is the term “public charity.” Unless otherwise indicated, all
references and citations in this article to the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) refer
to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, currently located at 26
U.S.C.A. (West 2004).
2. Entities that are “not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the
promotion of social welfare . . . and the net earnings of which are devoted
exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.” I.R.C. §
501(c)(4)(a).
3. I.R.C. § 6104(e), added in 1987, imposed a “public inspection” (as
opposed to hardcopy dissemination) requirement on both exempt organizations’
exemption applications and annual returns (except for private foundations’
annual returns, which were already subject to certain public availability
requirements). Nine years later, the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights II expanded the
requirements to include hardcopy dissemination of those same filings, but
postponed the effective date until sixty days after the issuance of Final Income Tax
Regulations. Pub. L. No. 104-68, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996) (amending I.R.C. §
1313(a)). Legislation in 1998 brought private foundations’ annual returns into
the scheme and deleted I.R.C. § 6104(e), moving these requirements to I.R.C. §
6104(d). Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998). Hard copy dissemination of
Forms 990 (or the alternative, Forms 990-EZ) was required as of June 8, 1999,
while hard copy dissemination of Forms 990-PF (required for private foundations)
was effective on March 13, 2000.
4. This is largely the result of the advent of the Internet site Guidestar.org.
http://www.guidestar.org. Anyone with access to the Internet can use the site to
search the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) database of 501(c)(3)-registered
organizations and to retrieve information on the organization including Forms
990 on the tax years begun in 1997 and in successive years for those in the IRS
database or those that have been added at their own initiative (as imperfections
exist in the IRS database). The IRS provides the forms themselves to the web site
sponsor, Philanthropic Research, Inc. (PRI), under a process that was initially
undertaken as a collaboration between the IRS, PRI, and the National Center for
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nonprofits that are accorded 501(c)(4) tax-exempt status are
subject to a tax scheme that imposes an excise tax if transactions
undertaken with certain parties fail to be at arm’s length. That
regulatory scheme taxes both the individual receiving the “excess
5
benefit” and directors who approved the payment. Furthermore,
IRS regulations state aspirational standards for boards of directors
to document precisely the process by which compensation
decisions are made for individuals who exercise substantial
6
influence over their organizations. In the wake of the scandals at
major corporations such as Enron and WorldCom, attorneys
general of several states are proposing additional legislative reforms
to ensure financial accountability of nonprofit organizations, and
both the Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means
Committee have recently held hearings on proposed reforms for
exempt organizations.
These increasing demands for accountability have, in turn,
amplified the pressure on boards of directors of all nonprofit
organizations to govern effectively.
But what is effective
governance in this new climate of accountability, particularly for
organizations holding exalted status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) and
concomitant “public charity” status under 509(a)? This article will
review current developments in the area of fiduciary duty of boards
Charitable Statistics. At present the site posts Forms 990 of approximately 290,000
charitable organizations, redacting only donors’ identifying information, as well as
signatures. Some charities post their own Form 990 filings to a web address of
their own choice as a mechanism to satisfy I.R.C. § 6104(d) with respect to the
requirement that they otherwise provide copies of returns upon written or inperson request. See supra, note 3 (explaining I.R.C. § 6104(d)).
5. I.R.C. § 4958, added in 1996 via enactment of the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights
II, actually was given retroactive effect, covering transactions back to September
14, 1995. Pub. L. No. 104-68, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996). However, the need for
regulatory address of the statute’s definitions, application, and minutiae resulted
in three Treasury Department pronouncements and resultant delay in
enforcement of the statute. Proposed regulations were initially issued on August
4, 1998, followed by temporary regulations on January 10, 2001 and final
regulations on January 23, 2002. 63 Fed. Reg. 41,486 (proposed Aug. 4, 1998); 66
Fed. Reg. 2144 (proposed Jan. 10, 2001); 67 Fed. Reg. 3076 (proposed Jan. 23,
2002) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 4958). I.R.C. § 4958 applies to all 501(c)(3)
organizations except those holding private foundation classification, and also
reaches organizations described in 501(c)(4) (in the latter instance, regardless of
whether exemption has been applied for, if the organization holds itself out as so
exempt). Given its scheme of applying to transactions with certain insiders for a
period of sixty months following their loss of such relationship or status, I.R.C. §
4958 also covers revoked 501(c)(3)s and 501(c)(4)s for a sixty-month period
following their loss of exemption.
6. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a) (2002).
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of directors of nonprofit tax-exempt organizations, to suggest what
current trends indicate may be enhanced definitions of directors’
fiduciary duties in the post-Enron environment.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF LAW GOVERNING FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS
Legal duties of officers and directors to the corporations they
govern have developed from the same principles as those
applicable to trustees. In early cases, directors of all corporations
were found to owe a duty to the corporation similar to that which a
7
trustee owes to a beneficiary. Later cases questioned the strictness
of that standard, and courts began to define the duties that
nonprofit directors owed to their organizations more in line with
the fiduciary standards that directors of business organizations
8
owed to their organizations. For example, the Federal District
Court for the District of Columbia notes in Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes
National Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries that the
“modern trend is to apply corporate rather than trust principles in
9
determining the liability of directors of charitable corporations.”
A. Duty of Care
In 1987, the American Bar Association promulgated the
Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (the “Revised Model
Act”), which also included the corporate standard for the duty of
care. Minnesota, among other states, adopted a version of the
10
Revised Model Act in 1988 as Minnesota Statutes chapter 317A.
11
Chapter 317A replaced the former chapter 317 in 1989.
Minnesota Statutes section 317A.251 sets out the standard of
care for directors that comports to the Revised Model Act,
requiring a director to discharge his or her duties “in good faith,
with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances and in a manner the
7. People v. Larkin, 413 F. Supp. 978, 982 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Burden v.
Burden, 54 N.E. 17, 23 (N.Y. 1899); MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 199-200 (2004).
8. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses &
Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974).
9. Id.
10. MINN. STAT. § 317A (2004).
11. See id. § 317A.
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director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
12
corporation.” A parallel provision applies to nonprofit corporate
13
officers. The duty of care embodied in these statutes generally
requires directors to carry out their responsibilities by staying
informed about the organization’s activities and acting to ensure
that directors’ decisions are made in good faith and with the intent
14
to further the organization’s purposes.
In an effort to limit the personal liability exposure of nonprofit
directors, several states have adopted statutory protections,
providing that a director is not liable to the corporation for an act
or omission unless that director’s actions are clearly self-interested,
15
in bad faith, or grossly negligent. As of January 1, 2003, a total of
thirty-one states had adopted such statutes, “although sixteen of the
16
statutes apply only if the director serves without compensation.”
Minnesota expanded the protections available to nonprofit
directors in 2003, when the Minnesota Supreme Court, in a case of
first impression, found that the “business judgment rule” applies to
shield nonprofit boards of directors from liability for decisions
made in good faith, where the director is disinterested, reasonably
informed, and honestly acting in a manner he or she believes to be
17
in the best interest of the corporation.
In Janssen v. Best &
Flanagan, the court found that several states explicitly apply the
business judgment rule to decisions made by nonprofit boards of
directors, while no other states deny application of the rule to
18
nonprofit board decisions. The court reasoned as follows:
In addition to finding support in other jurisdictions for
giving judicial deference to nonprofit corporate decisions,
the primary rationales for applying the business judgment
12. Id. § 317A.251.
13. Id. § 317A.361.
14. See generally id. § 317A (2004). As noted below, these statutes are read to
embody duties of loyalty and obedience. See infra parts II.B, II.C.
15. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5239(a) (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ch.
617.0834(1)(b)(3) (2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.2209(c) (2004).
16. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 7, at 226. See MINN. STAT. §317A.257, subd. 1
(2004) (providing that generally a person who serves without compensation as a
director, officer, trustee, member or agent of an organization exempt from state
income taxation under Minnesota Statutes section 290.05, subdivision 2, is not
civilly liable for an act or omission by that person if the act or omission was in
good faith, was within the scope of the person’s responsibilities as a director,
officer, trustee, member, etc., and did not constitute willful or reckless
misconduct).
17. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 2003).
18. Id. at 883.
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rule in the for-profit context apply in the nonprofit
context as well. Organizations are autonomous agents that
should control their own destiny. Directors of nonprofits
may take fewer risks than would be optimal if they were
overly concerned about liability for well-meaning
decisions. Additionally, courts are not well-equipped to
scrutinize the decisions of a corporation; judges should
not be caught in the middle of fighting factions of
nonprofits any more than they should be thrust between
dissatisfied shareholders and profit-seeking boards.
Therefore, we conclude that the boards of nonprofit
corporations may receive the protection of the business
19
judgment rule.
B. Duty of Loyalty
Generally, the duty of loyalty requires that corporate directors
and officers act in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed
20
to be in accordance with the best interests of the corporation. As
with the duty of care, Minnesota applies the duty of loyalty to
directors through the reach of Minnesota Statutes section
21
317A.251, and to officers through Minnesota Statutes section
22
317A.361.
Minnesota Statutes section 317A.255 speaks to and
expands aspirationally the duty of loyalty for directors, providing a
procedure for boards of directors to follow when conflicts of
interest arise that applies a higher level of scrutiny for transactions
23
with directors and parties to whom they are related. To such end,
Minnesota Statutes section 317A.255, subdivision 1 defines the
situations in which a “conflict of interest” exists with respect to the
corporation entering into contracts or transactions and then
provides for a “safe harbor” directors’ procedure that renders such
24
corporate actions not void or voidable. The situations in which
contracts or transactions would otherwise be void or voidable are:
A contract or other transaction between a corporation

19. Id. (citations omitted).
20. See, e.g. Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and
Officers: Paradoxes, Problems and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 641 (1998)
(quoting DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NON-PROFIT DIRECTORS 21
(1988)).
21. MINN. STAT. § 317A.251 (2004).
22. Id. § 317A.361.
23. Id. § 317A.255.
24. Id. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
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and: (1) its director or a member of the family of its
director; (2) a director of a related organization, or a
member of the family of a director of a related
organization; or (3) an organization in or of which the
corporation’s director, or a member of the family of its
director, is a director, officer or legal representative or has
25
a material financial interest.
Minnesota Statutes section 317A.255, subdivision 2 fails to give
a substantive definition of what constitutes a “material financial
interest,” but sets out that:
(1) [A] director does not have a material financial interest
in a resolution fixing the compensation of the director or
fixing the compensation of another director as a director,
officer, employee, or agent of the corporation, even
though the first director is also receiving compensation
from the corporation; and
(2) [A] director has a material financial interest in an
organization in which the director, or a member of the
26
family of the director, has a material financial interest.
In spite of the lack of statutory definition, “material financial
interests” are commonly understood to be those in which a
remunerative or exchange return is expected. Thus, it would be a
“material financial interest” for an individual to have rights
(whether or not yet vested) to be paid compensation, employee or
retiree benefits, dividends, or profit-sharing, or to have their
expenses reimbursed or obligations or other liabilities repaid, etc.
Similarly, exchange transactions (for example a sale of property)
would give rise to the participant’s “material financial interest.”
By specifically addressing what procedures, if followed by
directors (or others) would render such a “conflict of interest”
contract or transaction not voidable, the statute touches on only
27
one aspect of directors’ duty of loyalty. Also encompassed within
25. MINN. STAT. § 317A.255 (2004).
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. Minnesota Statutes section 317A.255 sets out the specific scenarios in
which a director’s conflict(s) of interest will cause a transaction to be void or
voidable, and outlines procedures that may be undertaken by the board of
directors to refute that consequence:
Subdivision 1.

Conflict; procedure when conflict arises.

(a) A contract or other transaction between a corporation and: (1) its
director or a member of the family of its director; (2) a director of a
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the duty of loyalty that directors (and, under Minnesota law,
officers) hold is the requirement that the corporation’s
information be kept confidential to the extent that the information
is privileged or that its release would compromise the corporation’s
opportunities; and that directors (and officers) refrain from actions
that are detrimental to the corporation’s interests (including
“taking” an opportunity of the corporation).
Recent cases interpreting the duty of loyalty addressed the
latter point and held that a corporate officer breached his fiduciary
duty of loyalty to a Minnesota nonprofit corporation. In Shepherd of
the Valley Lutheran Church of Hastings v. Hope Lutheran Church of
28
Hastings, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a vicepresident of a congregation breached his fiduciary duty when he
purposefully withheld material information from other officers and
members of the congregation of Shepherd of the Valley Lutheran
related organization, or a member of the family of a director of a related
organization; or (3) an organization in or of which the corporation's
director, or a member of the family of its director, is a director, officer, or
legal representative or has a material financial interest; is not void or
voidable because the director or the other individual or organization are parties or
because the director is present at the meeting of the members or the board or a
committee at which the contract or transaction is authorized, approved, or ratified,
if a requirement of paragraph (b) is satisfied.
(b) A contract or transaction described in paragraph (a) is not void or
voidable if:
(1) the contract or transaction was, and the person asserting the validity
of the contract or transaction has the burden of establishing that the
contract or transaction was, fair and reasonable as to the corporation
when it was authorized, approved, or ratified;
(2) the material facts as to the contract or transaction and as to the
director's interest are fully disclosed or known to the members and the
contract or transaction is approved in good faith by two-thirds of the
members entitled to vote, not counting any vote that the interested
director might otherwise have, or the unanimous affirmative vote of all
members, whether or not entitled to vote;
(3) the material facts as to the contract or transaction and as to the director's
interest are fully disclosed or known to the board or a committee, and the board or
committee authorizes, approves, or ratifies the contract or transaction in good faith
by a majority of the board or committee, not counting any vote that the interested
director might otherwise have, and not counting the director in determining the
presence of a quorum.
MINN. STAT. § 317A.255 (emphasis added).
28. 626 N.W.2d 436 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1082 (2002).
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Church in an attempt to create a competing congregation. The
court noted that, in order to establish a breach of fiduciary duty
claim, a plaintiff must show that “the action attacked is so far
opposed to the true interests of the corporation as to lead to the
clear inference that no officer thus acting could have been
30
influenced by an honest desire to secure such interests.”
The
court pointed out that the fiduciary duty of the officer extended to
all members of the congregation, not just to those who were allied
31
32
with him. In Mid-List Press v. Nora, the Federal District Court for
the District of Minnesota, applying Minnesota law, held that the
corporation’s founder and president violated his fiduciary duty
when he misappropriated the corporation’s trade name and
International Standard Book Numbers to publish his own book of
33
poetry.
C. Duty of Obedience
While the duty of obedience is not specifically identified in
statutory definitions of fiduciary duties applicable to nonprofit
boards and officers, this duty has become more accepted as a standalone requirement with which directors and officers must comply.
In its publication, “Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Charitable
Organizations,” the Minnesota Attorney General’s Office lists the
duty of obedience separately from the duties of care and loyalty,
and includes the following as specific obligations under it:
1. State and Federal Statutes. Directors should be familiar
with state and federal statutes and laws relating to
nonprofit corporations, charitable solicitations, sales and
use taxes, FICA and income tax withholding, and
unemployment and workers’ compensation obligations.
They should also be familiar with the requirements of the
Internal Revenue Service. Directors should see to it that
their organization’s status with state and federal agencies
is protected.
29. Id. at 442-43.
30. Id. at 442 (citing Westgor v. Grimm, 318 N.W.2d 56, 59 (Minn. 1982),
quoting Warner v. E.C. Warner Co., 226 Minn. 565, 573, 33 N.W.2d 721, 726
(1948)).
31. Id. See also Wenzel v. Mathies, 542 N.W.2d 634, 641 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that a fiduciary duty is owed to all persons who have equal interests and
concerns in the corporation and are subject to harm).
32. 275 F. Supp. 2d 997 (D. Minn. 2003).
33. Id. at 1003-04.
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2. Filing Requirements. Directors must comply with
deadlines for tax and financial reporting, for registering
with the Attorney General, for making social security
payments, for income tax withholding, and so on.
Additionally, if an organization is incorporated under the
Minnesota Nonprofit Corporation Act, its directors have a
duty to maintain its corporate status by submitting timely
filings to the Secretary of State’s Office.
3. Governing Documents. Directors should be familiar
with their organization’s governing documents and
should follow the provisions of those documents.
Directors should be sure proper notice is given for
meetings, that regular meetings are held, that directors
are properly appointed and that the organization’s
mission is being accomplished.
4. Outside Help. Where appropriate, directors should
34
obtain opinions of legal counsel or accountants.
D. State Attorney General Enforcement
Recent enforcement efforts by state attorneys general have
made it clear that nonprofit boards of directors will need to pay
35
more than lip service to fiduciary duties set out in state statutes.
Developments in the nonprofit, tax-exempt healthcare community
34. MINN. ATT’Y GEN., FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS OF CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATIONS: A GUIDE FOR BOARD MEMBERS (2003), available at http://www.
ag.state.mn.us/charities/charDuties.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
35. While this article focuses primarily on the enforcement efforts of the
Minnesota Attorney General’s office, it should be noted that other attorneys
general have stepped up enforcement efforts as well. A July 19, 2004 ABA position
paper prepared for the U.S. Senate Finance Committee hearing on July 22, 2004,
notes the following developments:
[I]n California the Attorney General has proposed the “Charity Integrity
Bill” and the “Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004, CA Senate Bill 1262” was
introduced; . . . in Hawaii, the Attorney General proposes legislation that
would give the Attorney General the authority to remove directors; in
Massachusetts, the Attorney General is proposing the “Act to Promote
the Financial Integrity of Public Charities;” and in New York, the
Attorney General has proposed the “Nonprofit Accountability Act” and
the legislature has introduced S. 4836 on behalf of the Attorney General
[requiring that the president or chief executive officer, or treasurer or
chief financial officer of each nonprofit corporation shall verify the
corporation’s annual report].
Letter from Richard A. Shaw, Chair, Section of Taxation, American Bar
Association, to Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Senate Committee on Finance,
App. F, n.4 (July 19, 2004) [hereinafter ABA LETTER].
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that both predate and are eerily parallel to the Enron debacle of
2001 are generally credited with generating this attention. The
Coalition for Nonprofit Healthcare published a “Corporate
Responsibility Guidebook” in November 2002, which tracks the
“corporate responsibility environment” as one informed by actions
of Minnesota Attorney General Mike Hatch in pursuing the Allina
organization in 2000-2001, but credits even before that (and
outside of Minnesota):
[T]he long-running saga of the bankruptcy and related
litigation involving AHERF [Allegheny Health Education
and Research Foundation], which began in 1998. At its
core, this controversy involved alleged failures of oversight
by corporate governance and lapses in the monitoring of
the financial integrity of the health system and the actions
of certain members of senior management.
The
bankruptcy, and ultimate settlement of ongoing litigation
in 2002, result in the return of over $75 million to existing
endowment funds . . . . The high-profile AHERF failure
(and resulting dissipation of charitable assets) has made
state attorneys general increasingly sensitive to their
obligation to monitor the degree of stewardship of
36
charitable assets by governing boards.
Not only has the current Minnesota Attorney General been
one of the country’s most proactive in pursuing organizations
37
perceived to have lax board oversight and insider self-dealing, but
his predecessor, Hubert H. Humphrey III, in office through the
year 2000, led an investigation in 1998 which resulted in an
agreement with one of Minnesota’s most beloved charitable
institutions, Minnesota Public Radio, to the end of ensuring the
board’s appropriate independent oversight in setting management
36. COALITION FOR NONPROFIT HEALTH CARE, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
GUIDEBOOK 2 (2002), available at http://www.healthlawyers.org/pg/tax/docs/
tax_guidebook_0212.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
37. In addition to Allina, Attorney General Mike Hatch pursued
HealthPartners for alleged fiduciary lapses, with similar publicity of his staff’s
investigative findings. His office also asserted breach of fiduciary responsibility
against the Board of Directors of Minnesota Partnership for Action Against
Tobacco. See Memorandum from Plaintiff State of Minnesota to Ramsey County
District Court File C1-94-8565 (arguing by the Attorney General that the Board
had a duty to act as a fiduciary for the State and the public in administering State
funds received in settlement of tobacco litigation brought by the State of
Minnesota against R.J. Reynolds and others, and failed to do so) (citing Shepherd
of the Valley Lutheran Church of Hastings v. Hope Lutheran Church of Hastings,
626 N.W.2d 436 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1082 (2002)).
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38

compensation.
Drawing on the statutory definitions of duties of directors of
nonprofit organizations in Minnesota Statutes sections 317A.251
and 317A.255, the Minnesota Attorney General’s website displays a
series of policies for nonprofits to consider when developing
standards to govern their operations and the conduct of board
39
members, officers, directors, and employees. According to the
Attorney General’s Office, its policies are offered as guides, and are
based in part upon the policies adopted by Allina in connection
with the Attorney General’s recent compliance investigation of that
organization.
With respect to conflicts of interest, the Minnesota Attorney
General’s sample policy emphasizes that board members, officers
and management employees owe the public a fiduciary duty,
“which carries with it a broad and unbending duty of loyalty and
40
fidelity.” The board, officers, and management employees have
the responsibility to administer the affairs of the nonprofit taxexempt organization they govern “honestly and prudently, and [to
exercise] their best care, skill, and judgment for the sole benefit of”
41
their organization.
Directors, officers, and management
employees “shall exercise the utmost good faith in all transactions
involved in their duties, and they shall not use their positions with
[the organization] or knowledge gained therefrom for their
personal benefit. The interests of the organization must be the first
42
priority in all decisions and actions.”
E. Internal Revenue Code
A charitable organization must serve a public, rather than a
private interest, in order to meet the “operational test” of I.R.C. §
43
501(c)(3). A charitable organization is not operated exclusively
for one or more exempt purposes if its net earnings inure in whole
38. Letter from Sheila S. Fishman, Manager, Charities Division, Minnesota
Attorney General’s Office, to John E. Harris, Attorney, Faegre & Benson LLP (Jan.
27, 1998) (on file with author).
39. See Minn. Att’y Gen. website, at http://www.ag.state.mn.us/charities/
Default.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
40. MINN. ATT’Y GEN., SAMPLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICY 1 (2004), at
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/pdf/charities/ConflictInterestPolicy.pdf (last visited
Oct. 1, 2004).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1990).
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or in part to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals
having a personal and private interest in the activities of the
44
organization.
These limitations have historically established an
IRS counterpart, at least from a qualification perspective, that
requires both charitable organizations and 501(c)(4) tax-exempt
45
entities to ensure that directors adhere to the fiduciary duty of
loyalty that is imposed on a state basis as set out in statutory and/or
case law.
Until 1996, the IRS was largely restricted in enforcing the
prohibition on private inurement as the only action available to
that agency was the revocation of exempt status from charitable
organizations that had engaged in such transactions with directors
or officers (or their family members). While this penalty may have
been effective to prevent the charitable organizations from
engaging in these activities in the future, it did nothing to recoup
improper payments of compensation or issuance of other benefits
to the individuals who had received them, and perhaps served a
countervailing purpose in ultimately causing the loss of programs
when revocation signaled loss of gift or grant income.
46
Congress added § 4958 to the I.R.C. in 1996.
Through
enactment of this section and its attendant regulations, the IRS
gained new and far-reaching power shy of revocation, to assess
excise taxes against certain individuals who receive unearned or
excessive compensation or other benefits from a charitable
organization (or other entities subject to the statute), and
potentially upon even other fiduciaries of the charitable
organization who approved the transaction, knowing it to convey
47
“excess benefit.” Section 4958 and its regulatory implementation

44. Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1990). The term
“private shareholder or individual” in § 501 refers to persons having a personal
and private interest in the activities of the organization. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)1(c) (as amended in 1982).
45. The Code was amended in 1996 to include a “no private inurement”
proscription for 501(c)(4) exemption. See Taxpayers Bill of Rights 2, H.R. 2337,
104th Cong. § 1311 (1996).
46. Id. (effective for transactions occurring on or after September 14, 1995).
See supra note 5.
47. Id. I.R.C. § 4958 applies to all 501(c)(3) organizations except those
classified as private foundations, to organizations described in 501(c)(4) (in the
latter instance, regardless of whether exemption has been applied for, if the
organization holds itself out as so exempt), and to entities who were revoked from
501(c)(3) status while holding non-private foundation status or from 501(c)(4)
status in the last 60 months. See supra note 5.
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are known as “intermediate sanctions,” as they represents an
arsenal of sanctions available to the IRS short of revocation of the
organization’s tax-exempt status.
In general, § 4958 sanctions apply when a subject entity has
48
engaged in an “excess benefit transaction” with one of its
“disqualified persons.” A “disqualified person” is a natural person
49
or organization who was in a position of “substantial influence”
over the affairs of the organization at any time during the five-year
period ending on the date of the transaction, as well as their family
members and parties in certain relationships to one or more
50
disqualified persons. An “excess benefit transaction” is one where
an economic benefit is provided by an applicable organization
directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified person,
and the value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the value
of the consideration (including the performance of services)
51
received by the organization for providing such benefit.
For
purposes of the intermediate sanctions regulations, the term
“compensation” is broad, and includes all forms of cash and noncash compensation, or benefits including salary, bonuses, deferred
compensation which is earned and vested, premiums for liability,
or any other insurance coverage and other types of benefits
52
(whether or not includable in taxable income).
It is important to note that Congress provided what is in
essence a “safe-harbor” for boards of directors to use in order to
switch the burden of proof away from the taxpayer (and,
accordingly, to the IRS) to show that a transaction with a
53
disqualified person has not conveyed any “excess benefit.” The
48. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a) (2002) (defining an excess benefit
transaction as one in which “an economic benefit is provided by an applicable taxexempt organization directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified
person, and the value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the
consideration (including the performance of services) received for providing the
benefit.”).
49. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(c) (2002) (classifying voting members of the
governing body; presidents, chief executive officers, or chief operating officers;
treasurers and chief financial officers; and persons with a material financial
interest in a provider-sponsored organization as automatically having “substantial
influence,” and providing a “facts and circumstances” test for others).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 53.4958-4(a).
52. Id. § 53.4958-4(b)(ii)(B)(1).
53. H.R. REP. NO. 104-506, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1143; Treas. Reg. §53.4958- 6 (2002) (providing a rebuttable
presumption that a transaction is not an excess benefit transaction).
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so-called “safe harbor” is no more than an aspirational standard for
appropriate due diligence when a conflict is noticed between the
organization and parties who themselves hold, or have a
relationship with someone who holds (or has been in the last sixty
months able to exert), substantial influence over the organization.
If the following procedures are undertaken, the amount of
compensation paid to a “disqualified person” is presumed to be
reasonable and/or a transfer of property between an exempt
organization and a “disqualified person” is presumed to be at fair
market value:
1) The compensation arrangement or terms of the
transfer are approved by the organization’s board of
directors, or committee of the board or a properly
54
authorized body independent of the disqualified person;
2) the decision-making board obtained and relied on
appropriate data regarding comparability before making
55
its determination; and 3) the decision-making body
adequately documented the basis for its determination by
the later of the next meeting of the decision-making
56
body, or sixty days after final approval of the transaction
57
by the decision-making body.
For organizations with less than $1 million of annual gross
receipts, the authorized body will be deemed to have considered
appropriate data on comparability of compensation if it has
reviewed data on compensation paid by three similar groups for
58
similar services.
In accord with the enactment of I.R.C. § 4958, Form 990 was
modified to reflect the application of the statute. Line 89b of Form
990 asks 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) filers whether the reporting
organization engaged in any “excess benefit transactions” during
the reporting year, or whether it became aware of any “excess
benefit transaction” from a prior year during the reporting year. In
addition to the specific reference to that excise tax scheme, it has
59
long been the case that Part III of Schedule A of Form 990 asks
54. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1) (2002).
55. Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(2).
56. Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(i).
57. Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(ii).
58. Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(ii).
59. The Schedule A is a required, six-page add-on to the annual return that is
required of all 501(c)(3) organizations holding public charity classification.
Schedule A (I.R.S. Form 990 or Form 990 E-Z) (2003), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990sa.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

15

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 3
MCVEIGHBORENSTEIN(LSK & CB).DOC

134

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

10/3/2004 8:34:53 PM

[Vol. 31:1

whether the organization has directly or indirectly engaged in
certain described transactions, such as furnishing goods or services,
during the reporting year, with a laundry list of individuals
including directors and officers, substantial contributors, family
60
members of those parties, etc.
Enforcement of intermediate sanctions by the IRS has begun
in earnest. IRS Commissioner Everson submitted written testimony
to the U.S. Senate Finance Committee in connection with a
61
hearing on exempt organization reform on June 22, 2004.
Commissioner Everson’s testimony makes clear that the IRS has
begun a new series of initiatives (including so-called “soft contacts”
and limited audits), which are anticipated to touch at least 1,000
charities in 2004. The IRS intends to ask these charities for
clarification about errors in their Form 990 filings or for
information on how executive compensation and/or terms for
transactions with insiders was set. While the Commissioner makes
clear that the IRS’s focus will be aimed at transactions and
organizations who willfully flaunt the tax rules, most of the IRS’s
initiatives are designed to reach---and will touch-–the more
common and pedestrian charities, whose errors, if that, are
inadvertent or sloppy, but certainly not malevolent.
Not
announced at the hearing, but well-communicated by IRS officials
in other ways these last few months, is that these 1,000 limited
contacts or audits represent the tip of the iceberg, as the IRS
expects to make a total of 11,000 contacts this year in total with
exempt organizations.
This modus operandi is undoubtedly
designed not only to show that “the sheriff is back in town” but also
to educate and motivate those who have been sloppy or imperfect
in complying with charity mandates (including management of
compensation and insider transactions). The goal of these efforts
is to have errant charities undertake reforms and move faster to
adopt best practices.
60. Schedule A, Part III, q. 2 asks if any enumerated transactions take place
by asking “[d]uring the year, has the organization, either directly or indirectly,
engaged in any of the following acts with any substantial contributors, trustees,
directors, officers, creators, key employees, substantial contributors, or members
of their families, or with any taxable organization with which any such person is
affiliated as an officer, director, trustee or majority owner, or principal
beneficiary?” Id.
61. The IRS released the Commissioner’s testimony as a written document on
June 21, 2004. Available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=124186,00.
html (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). See also infra part II.F (discussing the impact of the
Senate Finance Committee hearing).
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As Lois Lerner, Director of the Exempt Organization Rulings
and Agreements section of the IRS’ office for tax-exempt
organizations, noted in comments made at the American Bar
Association’s Tax Section Exempt Organization Committee
meeting on May 7, 2004:
We’re going to be targeting some high-risk areas-–loans to
employees, deals between employees and organizations,
compensation as compared to assets. We will be following
up with organizations that have checked the box saying
they’ve been involved in excess benefit transactions.
We’re also going to be following up on folks who haven’t
checked any box with regard to excess benefit
62
There are, I think, over 4,000 of the
transactions.
returns that we’ve looked at that don’t have anything
checked. And we thought, now, some of these people
might have forgotten or made a mistake, but that’s an
awful lot of them. So we want to look behind why aren’t
63
people checking the box.
As discussed earlier, IRS Commissioner Everson described
several efforts that the IRS is undertaking, including an initiative to
“explore the seemingly high compensation paid to individuals
associated with some exempt organizations.” He said that the
initiative would be “aggressive,” would include both traditional
examinations and compliance checks, and would aim to create
“positive tension for organizations as they decide on compensation
arrangements.” He also reported on a market segment initiative,
involving approximately 400 examinations, designed to provide the
IRS with more accurate information of the degree of compliance
by private foundations. And, explaining that audit levels have
fallen to historically low levels, he proposed to increase spending
on audits of tax-exempt and government entities by seventeen
percent by next year.

62. The question on Line 89b of the Form 990, to which Ms. Lerner refers in
her comment, has two alternative check boxes: one for “yes” and one for “no.”
When neither is checked, the filing organization is considered to not have made a
“complete” return and the accuracy of its reporting (failure to check equals a
“maybe”?) will be subject to IRS review, at least for those who find themselves the
subject of one of the announced initiatives to review such filers. Available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
63. Lois Lerner, Edited Transcript of the May 7, 2004 ABA Tax Section EO
Committee Meeting, 45 EXEMPT ORG. TAX. REV. 27 (2004).
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Recent Congressional Action

Spurred in part by the significant changes brought about in
64
the oversight of publicly traded entities by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
Congress has continued to investigate charitable organizations’
practices, particularly with respect to excessive compensation and
private inurement. In 2003, two well-publicized reports harshly
critical of how charity managers fail to guard against insider
benefit, both in the private foundation and public charity
65
communities, were published.
Those reports, alongside the
66
House of Representatives’ passage of H.R. 7, suggest that big
changes are in the works for the charitable sector.
Indications of the further regulation that Congress is

64. American Competitiveness and Corporate Accountability (SarbanesOxley) Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7501-7266 (West Supp. 2004). While most of
the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act do not directly apply to nonprofit
charitable organizations, many commentators have discussed the implications of
the Act for the charitable sector. See, e.g., Suzanne Ross McDowell, Should Nonprofit
Organizations Adopt the Rules of Sarbanes-Oxley?, 16 TAX’N OF EXEMPTS 1, July/Aug.
2004; BOARDSOURCE & INDEPENDENT SECTOR, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (2003), at http://indepedent
sector.org/PDFs/sarbanesoxley.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2004) [hereinafter
BOARDSOURCE]; Patrice A. Heinz, The Financial Reporting Practices of Nonprofits,
ALLIANCE FOR CHILD. AND FAM’S SARBANES-OXLEY REP., Aug. 2003, at
http://www.alliance1.org/Home/SOX_final_8-03.pdf; Thomas A. McLaughlin,
For-Profit Spillover: New Regulation and Independence, NONPROFIT TIMES, Feb. 1, 2003,
at http://static.highbeam.com/t/thenonprofittimes/february012003/forprofits
pillovernewregulationofindependencetree/; Martin Michaelson, A New Era of
Corporate Governance Bears Down on Higher Education, 11 TRUSTEESHIP 37 Jan./Feb.
2003; Thomas Silk, Ten Emerging Principles of Governance of Nonprofit Corporations, 43
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 35 (2004).
65. CHRISTINE AHN ET AL., GEORGETOWN PUB. POLICY INST., FOUNDATION
TRUSTEE FEES: USE AND ABUSE (2003), available at http://cpnl.georgetown.edu/
doc_pool/TrusteeFees.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). Starting in October 2003
and continuing into 2004, the Boston Globe ran a series of articles spotlighting
private foundation abuses. See, e.g., Beth Healey, Foundation’s Sale of Nonprofit
Hospital a Windfall for Administrator, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 9, 2003, at A42; Beth
Healey et al., Charity Money Funding Perks, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 2003, at A1; Beth
Healey et al., Foundation Lawyers Enjoy Privileged Position, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 17,
2003, at A1; Beth Healey et al., Some Officers of Charities Steer Assets to Selves, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 9, 2003, at A1.
66. H.R. 7, 108th Cong. (2003). The initial version of H.R. 7 would have
strongly limited the administrative expenses of the private foundation community;
in its passed version it did so more modestly, excluding from characterization as
“qualifying distributions” (which in general must be paid out at a rate of 5% of all
investment assets) three categories of administrative expenses: “indirect”
administrative expenses, compensation exceeding $100,000 for specific categories
of individuals, and certain air travel expenses. Id.
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contemplating emerged in testimony and preliminary legislative
proposals that were discussed at a hearing held on June 22, 2004
67
before the U.S. Senate Finance Committee.
While many who
testified at that hearing were more muted in their call for
68
Congressional reforms, a bipartisan “Staff Draft,” issued jointly by
the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Charles
Grassley (R-IA) and the ranking Member, Senator Max Baucus (DMT), harshly criticized current nonprofit practices in three areas:
69
tax evasion, governance, and operations.
With respect to the first arena – tax evasion – concern was
expressed that tax shelter practices of an abusive nature have
spread significantly to the charitable community. Chairman
Grassley said that there are “a growing number of individuals who
70
Senator Baucus
knowingly set up a charity to evade taxes.”
71
criticized “charities engaging in abusive tax shelters.”
IRS
Commissioner Everson said that, if the abuses were not checked,
“there is the risk that Americans not only will lose faith in and
reduce support for charitable organizations, but that the integrity
72
of our tax system also will be compromised.” The practices of
concern fell into two main categories: outright tax fraud and
sophisticated shelters. It should be noted that included in the “tax
fraud” category were reports of overvaluation (by donating
taxpayers) of donated cars and other assets. Any charity taking
67. Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening to Good
Charities: Hearing before the S. Fin. Comm., 108th Cong. (2004),
http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing062204.htm (last visited on Aug. 10,
2004) [hereinafter Hearings].
68. In addition to the Commissioner of the IRS, Mark Everson, other key
witnesses included William Josephson, Assistant Attorney General of New York
(Charities Bureau); Diana Aviv, President and CEO, Independent Sector; Derek
Bok, President Emeritus, Harvard University; and Mark Macella, on behalf of the
National Association of State Charity Officials. Id. There also were other
witnesses, including those whose identity was concealed, testifying about various
types of fraud that they had participated in or witnessed. Id.
69. The third problem described at the hearing, related to operations,
addressed whether charities were devoting sufficient efforts towards achieving
their charitable purpose. Id. As those underlying issues were not emphasized by
the Committee’s Chair or Ranking member, nor the state witnesses, they are
omitted from discussion here.
70. Id. at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/statements/062204cg.pdf (last
visited Oct. 4, 2004).
71. Id. at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/statements/062204mb.pdf (last
visited Oct. 1, 2004).
72. Id. at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204me
test.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
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donations of non-cash property (including intellectual property)
will be well served to apply due diligence to the organization’s
practices in this area.
Governance reforms also occupy much attention in the Staff
Draft. Chairman Grassley spoke of the various failings witnessed
(or awaiting disclosure) at charities where “poor governance or
73
failure to abide [by] best practices” occurs.
Senator Baucus
74
IRS
criticized “inflated salaries” and “insider deals.”
Commissioner Everson (speaking for the current White House)
started his testimony by addressing “the need for enhanced
75
governance.” Invoking recent problems in the corporate sector,
he said:
In recent years there have been a number of very
prominent and damaging scandals involving corporate
governance of publicly traded organizations.
The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act has addressed major concerns about
the interrelationships between a corporation, its
executives, its accountants and auditors, and its legal
counsel. Although Sarbanes-Oxley was not enacted to address
issues in tax-exempt organizations, these entities have not been
immune from leadership failures. We need go no further than our
daily newspapers to learn that some charities and private
foundations have their own governance problems. Specifically, we
have seen business contracts with related parties, unreasonably
high executive compensation, and loans to executives. . . . All
these reflect potential issues of ethics, internal oversight, and
76
conflicts of interest.
Everson went on to specifically criticize “the governing boards of
tax-exempt organizations [that] are not, in all cases, exercising
sufficient diligence as they set compensation for the leadership of
77
the organizations.”
The Staff Draft includes the following proposed regulatory
changes related to exempt organization governance. While these
78
proposals have not been made law at this time, they provide
73. Id. at http://finance.senate.gov//hearings/statements/062204cg.pdf
(last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
74. Id. at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/statements/062204mb.pdf (last
visited Oct. 1, 2004).
75. Id. at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204me
test.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. An invitation-only, closed-door hearing was scheduled by the U.S. Senate
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insight into the breadth of the changes that are being
contemplated. In fact, they reveal that Congress is considering the
need to extend the authority of the IRS into areas of nonprofit
governance that have only been subject to State oversight in the
past. Some of the proposals would:
(a) Change governance practices–-these will have to be
adopted and maintained in order for 501(c)(3) status to be granted
and/or continued:
• Size of boards-–would require boards to consist of
between three and fifteen members.
• Boards would have to establish and oversee---basic
organizational and management policies; program
objectives and performance measures; the conduct of
business, including approving significant transactions;
accounting and auditing practices (including retaining
of an independent auditor); review and approval of
budgets.
• Boards would be required to have conflict of interest
policies and would be required to report annually on
Form 990 a summary of determinations made under
the policy.
• Boards would have to establish and maintain a
compliance program, and include in same procedures
for reviewing complaints against the organization.
(b) Increase transparency of board’s decision-making in
general and specifically with respect to overseeing key staff and
managing compensation:
• Organizations would be required to report how often
the Board of Directors met, including how often the
meeting occurred without the CEO (or equivalent)
present.
• New safe harbors and ceilings for compensation to
certain individuals would be created (in some cases
mandatory IRS review would be required); in addition,
annual review by the board and public disclosure of
supporting
materials
considered
in
setting
Finance Committee on July 22, 2004 as a follow-up. The American Bar Association
prepared comments on the Staff Draft for that hearing, many of which urged
Congressional restraint. See ABA LETTER, supra note 35.
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compensation would be required.
(c) Require every tax-exempt organization to undergo a
review, every five years, to determine “whether the organization
continues to be organized and operated exclusively for an exempt
79
purpose.”
(d) Permit IRS to share confidential taxpayer information with
state regulators.
(e) Create new rights of action, allowing states, directors, or
private individuals to bring an action against a charitable
organization for violating federal tax and other requirements.
(f) Require an organization’s Form 990 to be reviewed by a socalled “independent auditor”; increase penalties for failing to file
timely and create new penalties for errors in reporting on the form.
(g) Require the CEO of an exempt organization to sign a
statement that the CEO had put procedures in place that would
ensure that the organization’s filings with the IRS complied with
the tax laws.
(h) For all charities, limit expenses for travel, meals, and
accommodation to the applicable federal governmental rate.
(i) Establish a new series of federal standards or “best
practices” for the governance of tax-exempt organizations. The
basic standard is akin to the standard already enunciated in
Minnesota law for nonprofit corporations, but breach of the new
standards would bring federal liability:
In performing duties, a Board member has to perform his
or her duties in good faith; with the care an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would exercise under
similar circumstances; and in a manner the director
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
79. It is interesting that the President/CEO of Independent Sector, Diana
Aviv, seemed to support some version of this proposal, noting that “there is an
interest by some in a more thorough examination of a sampling of public charities
from time to time to ascertain whether the organizations continue to meet the
requirements for recognition as charitable tax-exempt organizations.” Hearings,
supra note 67.
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mission, goals, and purposes of the corporation. An
individual who has special skills or expertise has a duty to
80
use such skills or expertise.
III. WHAT THE DEVELOPMENTS PORTEND REGARDING “DEMANDS
FOR INCREASED CAPACITY”
Nonprofit board governance has always been subject to
oversight by a combination of state and federal laws and
regulations. In the wake of some abuses of nonprofit organizations
by key staff and governors in both the for-profit and nonprofit
worlds, oversight by governmental authorities is stepping up. In
addition, public awareness of and interest in issues of nonprofit
governance has increased. Lois Lerner, in her remarks to the ABA
Tax Section Exempt Organization Committee in May 2004, noted
that the increased availability of information about charitable
organizations to state and federal regulators and to the public will
act to discourage organization managers from abusing their
positions as insiders of their organizations:
I mean [there is] more and better information out there
about the organizations. If the information is out there
and available to the IRS, to the public, to state regulating
organizations, we think that that’s going to provide for
broader oversight and, again, a little bit more focused
thinking on the part of those people who run the
organizations and those of you who deal with the
organizations. We think it will actually help you in your
job to explain to the folks who are coming in to talk to
you that what you’re doing is going to be out there, it’s
going to be available, you’re going to be reading about
yourself in the paper, and you want it to be positive rather
81
than negative.
The June 2004 hearing before the U.S. Senate Finance
Committee and new initiatives undertaken by the IRS indicate that
board governance will remain a key focus of interest and increased
regulation. The trend on both the state and federal levels appears
to be two-pronged: providing more and better information to
charitable organizations on existing law and best practices for
80. SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE, STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT (2004), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 1, 2004).
81. Lerner, supra note 63.
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governance; and, particularly with the federal developments that
have been discussed above, increased enforcement efforts to
emphasize how serious a matter the responsible fiduciary control of
charitable funds is.
A. Duty of Care Recommendations
Nonprofit charitable organizations would do well to review
their governance practices to ensure that they are compliant with
whatever new regulatory arrangements result from the current
82
Several commentators have
concerns over accountability.
83
recommended specific steps in this area. In particular, in the area
of compliance with the fiduciary duty of care, the authors
recommend that charitable organizations should:
(a) Recruit knowledgeable board members with skills
in financial, programmatic and other substantive areas
relevant to the applicable organization;
(b) Educate board members regarding their duties and
encourage them to actively question management and
outside advisors on any “red flags” they see;
(c) Ensure that board members know and follow
written policies and procedures of the organization, and
that they ensure that management complies with these as
well;
(d) Educate potential board members about the
commitment and responsibilities that their service will
entail;
(e) Develop internal controls that require
management to report significant events to the board, and
82. See, e.g., MINN. ATT’Y GEN., FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS OF CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATIONS (2003), available at http://www.ag.state.mn.us/charities/char
Duties.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2004) (providing information that is relevant to
board members’ fiduciary duties).
83. See, e.g., Silk, supra note 64; BOARDSOURCE, supra note 64. In addition, the
authors would like to acknowledge the benefit of the recommendations made by
Nancy Evert, in Best Practices for Governance and Management of Charitable
Organizations in a Post-Enron Environment, Address at the Minnesota Council of
Nonprofits Annual Conference (Oct. 2, 2003).
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that specifies size or kinds of transactions that require board
approval;
(f) Develop board self-evaluation mechanism (with the
opportunity for input from staff and management) to
ensure effective operation of the board, its committees and
its individual directors;
(g) For larger organizations, consider the
appropriateness of an outside “independent” audit
committee: “independent” meaning composed of directors
who are without ties to management or the auditor, without
conflicts of interest, and who are not compensated. This
committee would be charged with reviewing the audit in
detail, hiring and supervising the auditor’s work with the
organization, and ensuring that complaint procedures are
in place for issues related to financial management of the
corporation.
They may also be responsible for risk
management oversight.
B. Duty of Loyalty Recommendations
To comply with the fiduciary duty of loyalty, charitable
organizations should identify meaningful ways to encourage board
members, officers and staff to embrace the variety of resources they
bring to the organization, but acknowledge at the same time that
these connections inevitably lead to divided loyalties or “conflicts of
interest.” In the authors’ experience, the title “conflict of interest”
84
in the heading of Minnesota Statutes section 317A.255 and
analogous other state statutes is too often read as defining the only
situations in which a director must provide notice of a “conflict of
interest.” A director’s withholding of information concerning a
real, or even potential “conflict of interest” that falls outside of the
statute’s narrow list of voidable transactions, may still comprise a
breach of fiduciary duty to the extent that it prevents the
corporation from evaluating whether an undertaking is in the best
interest of the corporation.
The statute correctly underscores that transactions between
the corporation and directors, their family members, or
organizations that are related to directors, as well as between
84.

See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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organizations related to the corporation and directors, their family
85
and related organizations, are the most susceptible of conflict.
However, our experience has shown that those are not the only
scenarios in which a director may have other interests that could be
at odds with the charge to serve the corporation’s “best interests”
(in accord with the overarching standard of care from which the
three duties being discussed in this part emanate). Loyalty with
respect to serving the corporation and its best interests
encompasses ongoing obligations well beyond managing the
conflict scenarios with respect to whether the corporation meets
one’s own (or other so-called “insiders”) interests.
We recommend the following specific steps in this regard:
(a) Adopt a substantive conflict of interest policy that
addresses at minimum three types of transactions:
(1) Direct and
(2) indirect related-party transactions with officers
and/or directors, including in this tier as ‘indirectrelated party transactions’ those that occur with
“close family members” of officers and/or directors,
other
individuals
or
with
non-501(c)(3)
organizations with which officers and/or directors
or their “close family members” are affiliated.
86
(3) Perceived conflict of interest transactions.
(b) Document, with respect to any such related-party
transactions, the pool of others who have been given
consideration for the same opportunity, along with relevant
features of their offers, reasons for choosing related party,
and have the fact of a related-party’s involvement, along
with full facts thereof disclosed along with the other
85. MINN. STAT. § 317A.255 (2004).
86. See SAMPLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICY, supra note 40. A different
sample conflict of interest policy that encompasses the three tiers of transactions
noted here, direct and indirect related-party transactions and a broader group of
situations in which board members, officers and staff may have dual allegiances to
the nonprofit organization they serve and to personal interests may be found on
the authors’ website, http://www.bamlawoffice.com/pdf/sample_coi_policy.pdf.
Note that neither policy, however, sets out the procedures that are necessary to
avail the corporation of the so-called “intermediate sanctions safe-harbors” for
direct and indirect related-party transactions reached by I.R.C. § 4958.
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information here in advance of the meeting in which the
decision is to be made. (Note that in the case of tier-1
transactions, it may be necessary for the Board to procure
independent comparability data to evaluate as part of
setting the transaction’s terms, to avoid excise tax liability
87
under I.R.C. § 4958.)
(c) Set a higher threshold for approving the
transaction (for example, requiring same to be approved by
2/3 of the uninterested directors, rather than the majority
that would typically be required for an act of the Board),
and document all votes yea or nay on the transaction.
(d) Have Board members regularly review the
organizations with which they have a “material financial
interest,” and the pool of connections their “close family
members” (as the corporation’s policy has defined those
individuals) have with other individuals and/or
organizations in which they hold a “material financial
interest.”
(e) Document, with respect to any compensation issues
with insiders, that compensation is reasonable based on
objective data; that only uninterested directors considered
the data and how the Board arrived at a decision about it;
and who was at the meeting approving the compensation.
C. Duty of Obedience Recommendations
To ensure that the organization complies with the duty of
obedience, charitable organizations should develop a method by
which directors are educated regarding the governmental filings
that are required, and understand what mechanisms are in place
each year to ensure that same are timely and accurately filed. Of
particular importance for fiduciaries in the current climate is
planning to bring appropriate review to the organization’s
completed Annual Return of Exempt Organization (i.e., Forms
990, 990-EZ and 990-PF). The authors anticipate from the clear
trend of the law in this area, as well as likely calls for increased

87.

See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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88

disclosure of charity’s governance capacity on such filings , that
fiduciaries of charitable organizations will be expected to know
what information is disclosed about the organization’s activities and
undertakings (including transactions with insiders) on these filings.
89
Undertaking educational initiatives now with boards, as well as
with internal reviewers and/or paid preparers of Form 990 series
filings, would be a valuable proactive step, particularly given that
these filings are now, as discussed above, the focus of both
increased IRS enforcement review and public scrutiny.

88. For example, the July 19, 2004 ABA submission to the Senate Finance
Committee hearing supported in large part the recommendation in the
Committee’s Staff Draft that additional governance focus be advanced through the
addition of new Form 990 series questions. ABA LETTER, supra note 35. The ABA
letter states that the “concept in the Discussion Draft that the Form 990 could be
used as a vehicle to promote strong governance and best practices is appealing for
a number of reasons. . . . including a governance section on the Form 990 would
allow the IRS to educate charities on the importance of this issue . . . .” Id. The
same submission also made the suggestion that “Form 990 might also include a
check-box affirmation that copies of Form 990 were provided to each member of
the EO’s governing body.” Id. at 5.
89. Over the course of the last several years, various initiatives have developed
to encourage improved education of board members and officers on the Form 990
filing that is required for almost all exempt organizations (the chief exception
from the filing requirement is for churches) whose gross receipts average more
than $25,000 a year. For example, in 2001 a group of representatives of the
Minnesota Attorney General's office, the private bar (including the authors), the
CPA community, and finance officers of Minnesota charities began working
together as the Minnesota Nonprofit Accountability Collaborative (“NAC”). The
group designed workshops and publications on the theme "Making Your Form 990
Work for You." That effort, which culminated in 2003, yielded eight workshop
presentations to date and produced two technical assistance publications for lay
readers, including "Tips for Telling the Truth---a Form 990 Tool,” available at
http://www.crcmn.org/npresources/truthtips.pdf. This publication addresses the
four priority areas that the NAC found that 990 preparers were in need of the
most education: explicating program service accomplishments; documenting and
disclosing expenses appropriately under the Statement of Functional Expenses;
understanding what comprises reportable fundraising expenses; and disclosing
insider transactions and compensation. Id.
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